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INTEGRATION AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE EUROPEAN 
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L INTRODUCTION 
"Economic integration" is an ambiguous term. Bela Balassa 1 
notes several different forms of economic relationships between 
states that represent varying degrees of economic integration. In 
particular, he mentions categories representing five different 
levels of relationships: a free trade area, a customs union, a com-
mon market, an economic union, and complete economic integra-
tion. 2 This analysis distributes different types of integration along 
a continuum without suggesting that the lines of demarcation be-
tween the different categories are clear. All of the non-socialist 
regional economic organizations fall somewhere along the con-
tinuum, but at any particular time they may be moving to a 
greater level of integration or be in the process of shrinking to less.3 
• Professor of Law, Rutgers, the State University School of Law at Camden, N.J. 
This paper was prepared as a contribution to an exchange of views between a group of 
United States-based scholars and members of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, In-
stitute of State and Law, on "Economic Integration in East and West." 
1. B. BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2 (1961). 
2. Balassa explains, id., that: 
In a free-trade area, tariffs and quantitative restrictions between the par-
ticipating countries are abolished, but each country retains its own tariffs against 
nonmembers. Establishing a customs union involves, besides the suppression of 
discrimination in the field of commodity movements within the union; the equaliza-
tion of tariffs in trade with nonmember countries. A higher form of economic in-
tegration is attained in a common market, where not only trade restrictions but 
also restrictions on factor movements are abolished. An economic union, as 
distinct from a common market, combines the suppression of restrictions on com-
modity and factor movements with some degree of harmonization of national 
economic policies, in order to remove discrimination that was due to disparities in 
these policies. Finally, total economic integration presupposes the unification of 
monetary, fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies and requires the setting-up of 
a supra-national authority whose decisions are binding for the member states (foot-
note omitted). 
3. The main ones are: 
a. European Communities. Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel 
Community, done 18 April 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (effective 23 July 1952); 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done 25 March 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (effective 1 Jan. 1958) (hereinafter Treaty of Rome); 
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, done 25 
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Indeed, as a legal, political, or merely descriptive concept, "in-
tegration" is commonly used to refer not only to the dictionary 
meaning of integration as the combination of two or more units or 
March 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 (effective 1 Jan. 1958) (these three Com-
munities represent in Balassa's terms at least a common market, with tenden-
cies toward an economic union). 
b. European Free Trade Area. Convention Establishing the European Free 
Association, done 4 January 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 5 (effective 3 May 1960) (free 
trade area). 
c. Latin American Free Trade Area. Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area 
and Instituting the Latin American Free Trade Association, 18 February 
1960, reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF LATIN 
AMERICA 207 (1968) (free trade area). 
d. Central American Area. General Treaty on Central American Economic In-
tegration, done 13 December 1960, 45 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective on ratification), 
reprinted in INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF LATIN 
AMERICA, supra at 23 (seems to be a free trade area, in spite of the more 
grandiose sounding title). 
e. Central African Area. Treaty Establishing a Central African Economic and 
Customs Union, done 8 December 1964, reprinted in 4 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 669 
(1965) (seems common market, perhaps more). Charter of the Union of Cen-
tral African States, done 2 April 1968, reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 725 
(1968) (vague, perhaps customs union or even common market or economic 
union). It is unclear as to the extent to which the second of these supersedes 
the first and to the extent to which both are superseded by the Economic 
Community of West African States, para. i. infra. 
f. Australian-New Zealand Free Trade Area. New Zealand-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement, done 31 August 1965, 554 U.N.T.S. 169 (effective 1 Jan. 
1966) (free trade area). 
g. Andean Subregion. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, done 26 
May 1969, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 910 (1969); as amended by An-
dean Group: Treaty Establishing the Andean Parliament, done 25 October 
1979, reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 269 (1980); and Andean Group: 
Agreement Establishing the Andean Council, done 12 November 1979, 
reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 612 (1980) (common market, perhaps 
economic union). See generally F. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE ANDEAN LEGAL 
ORDER: A NEW COMMUNITY LA w (1978). With the recent treaties creating ad-
ditional organs, the Andean Group appears to have the most sophisticated 
organization apart from the European Communities. 
h. Caribbean Community Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, done 4 
July 1973, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1033 (1973). See discussion and 
documents in H. GEISER, P. ALLEYNE & c. GAJRAJ. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CARIB-
BEAN INTEGRATION: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CARICOM (1976). 
i. West African Area. Articles of Association for the Establishment of an 
Economic Community of West Africa, 4 May 1967, 595 U.N.T.S. 287 (1967). 
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, 28 May 1975, 
reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1200 (1975). The latter agreement, which 
has a broader membership, appears to supersede the former and may also do 
the same to the Central African items in para. e, supra. See generally 
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of some of their functions, but also to the dynamic process involv-
ed. 
The movement towards economic integration proceeds on the 
basic assumption that increasing the size of the unit will improve 
the processes of production and distribution, through more effi-
cient use of existing resources, and also through greater 
development-the creation of more resources. This supposition is 
nicely encapsulated in article 2 of the Treaty of Rome, the agree-
ment which established the European Economic Community in 
1957. It provides that: 
[I]t shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common 
Market and progressively approximating the economic policies 
of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a har-
monious development of economic activities, a continuous and 
balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated rais-
ing of the standard of living and closer relations between its 
Member States.4 
Zagaris, The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWASJ: 
Analysis and Prospects, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 93 (1978). 
4. Treaty of Rome, art. 2. Article 3 goes on to provide: 
For the purposes set out in the preceding Article, the activities of the Community 
shall include under the conditions and with the timing provided for in this Treaty: 
a. the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of quantita-
tive restrictions on the importation and exportation of goods, as well as of all 
other measures with equivalent effect; 
b. the establishment of a common customs tariff and a common commercial policy 
towards third countries; 
c. the abolition, as between Member States, of the obstacles to the free movement 
of persons, services and capital; 
d. the inauguration of a common agricultural policy; 
e. the inauguration of a common transport policy; 
f. the establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be distorted 
in the Common Market; 
g. the application of procedures which shall make it possible to co-ordinate the 
economic policies of Member States and to remedy disequilibria in their 
balances of payments; 
h. the approximation of their respective municipal law to the extent necessary for 
the functioning of the Common Market; 
i. the creation of a European Social Fund in order to improve the possibilities 
of employment for workers and to contribute to the raising of their standard of 
living; 
j. the establishment of a European Investment Bank intended to facilitate the 
economic expansion of the Community through the creation of new resources; 
and 
k. the association of the overseas countries and territories with a view to increas-
ing trade and to pursuing jointly their effort towards economic and social 
development. 
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The detailed application of goals like this varies between 
developed and developing countries, and there is at least some 
dispute about the extent to which integration theory applies to 
developing countries. Balassa, the leading economic theorist on in-
tegration, asserts that: 
[E]conomic integration in Europe serves to avoid discrimination 
caused by trade-and-payments restrictions and increased state 
intervention, and is designed to mitigate cyclical fluctuations 
and to increase the growth of national income. In 
underdeveloped countries, considerations of economic develop-
ment are of basic importance; further contributing fal'tors are 
imitative behavior and the endeavor to protect these economies 
from possible adverse effects of European economic integration.5 
A further theoretical position espoused by some proponents 
of economic integration is echoed in the final words of article 2 of 
the Treaty of Rome which promote closer relations between the 
States belonging to it. This is the position that economic integra-
tion is only a stop on the road to political integration. Some sup-
porters of this approach assert that gradually increasing economic 
integration will lead inevitably to political integration and some 
kind of federal structure. Once enough progress has been made 
with "technical matters," political unity will follow by some pro-
cess of alchemy .6 I confess to considerable skepticism about this 
notion, and the practical performance of existing organizations of 
economic integration does little to support it. 
The remarks that follow are devoted primarily to an examina-
The leading treatise in English on the Community is H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LA w OF THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY (1976). A casebook 
crammed with useful material is E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE: TEXT, CASES AND READINGS (1976). The introductory 
chapter of P. HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PATTERNS FOR NEW 
LEGAL STRUCTURES (1966) is an excellent discussion of the concept of integration and the 
whole book is full of thoughtful material about our subject in general. A useful introductory 
work is D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LA w AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES (3rd ed. 1976). 
5. BALASSA, supra note 1, at 6. 
6. I have in mind such works as E. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC FORCES, 1950-1957 (1958) and the same author's BEYOND THE NATION STATE: 
FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1964). For a critical account of the Haas 
"spill-over" theory and of related theories together with some doubts about the relevance of 
United States analogies see Warnecke, American Regional Integration Theories and the 
European Community 1971 INTEGRATION 1. 
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tion of the principles and processes involved in the most 
developed of the non-socialist regional economic groupings, the 
European Communities. There are three overlapping Com-
munities composed of the same ten states: the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Agency 
(EURATOM), and the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Most of the specific remarks apply to the EEC but the general 
remarks are applicable to all three. This paper will review three of 
the most important features of the European Community viewed 
as an exercise in integration: first, the effort to create suprana-
tional institutions; second, the creation of a distinct legal order; 
and third, the treaty-making power of the Community. These are 
by no means the only features that one might discuss. One 
distinguished commentator7 has suggested, inter alia, two other 
crucial features, the automatic dismantlement of intra-community 
trade barriers by means of a series of compulsory linear reduc-
tions, 8 and the inclusion of agriculture within the Treaty regime.9 
The scope of this paper will be confined, however, to the three 
features indicated above. It will be noted that each of these three 
points is related to the concept of the EEC as an example of 
"supranationality ," a term (like "integration") of slippery meaning. 
but a suggestive one nonetheless. As Inis Claude, Jr. says: 
The concept of supranationality has not been precisely defined. 
Some observers stress as crucial the capacity to make binding 
decisions on important matters by majority vote, while others 
emphasize the substantial authority conferred upon organs com-
posed of persons other than governmental representatives, and 
still others stress the competence of the agencies to deal directly 
and authoritatively with firms and individuals within member 
states.10 
7. Riesenfeld, Legal Systems of Regional Economic Integration, 22 AM. J . COMP. L. 
415 (1974). 
8. Referring to Treaty of Rome arts. 12-17, Riesenfeld, id. at 418, says "[t]he Treaty 
wisely avoided the pitfalls of periodic product-by-product negotiations and utilized the initial 
integrative momentum to achieve a fixed course of progress." (footnote omitted). 
9. Id. at 419-420. 
10. I. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES - THE PROBLEMS AND PltOGRESS OF INTER· 
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION 109 (4th ed. 1971). While dealing with definitional matters, it should 
perhaps be noted that the term "community" itself carries connotations of integration and 
supranationality. See HAY. supra note 4 at 39-42. 
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To these three instances of the use of the term "supranationality" 
must be added a fourth- the transfer of power formerly exercised 
by a sovereign state to an organization formed by a collectivity of 
states. Even if the organ of the entity that exercises power is com-
posed of governmental representatives, the dynamics of the exer-
cise of power shift when it is the entity that is functioning rather 
than the organs of constituent states. In what follows, whenever 
the term "supranationality" appears, it will be used with at least 
one of these four connotations, a theme which shall be summarized 
in the conclusion of this paper. 
It is worth no~ing the influence of United States thinking on the 
political and jurisprudential bases of economic integration. Both in 
Europe11 and elsewhere12 the United States has encouraged in-
tegration as a path to economic growth. Whether this encourage-
ment has been for altruistic reasons, such as the recovery of 
Europe from the devastation of war, and the lessening of Franco-
German rivalry, or for more cynical reasons of profit, may be 
argued. As has been remarked in terms that are as applicable to 
Europe as to the area to which they were addressed, "it may be 
that [the United States'] warmth towards a Latin American Com-
mon Market was due to its belief that the chief beneficiaries of the 
market would be the United States transnational corporations 
rather than the Latin American countries."13 Whatever the reason 
for political support, United States jurisprudential thinking on the 
nature of federalism, and in particular the role of a court having 
power to make binding decisions on matters affecting the 
"federal" power and structure, are apparent.14 This is not to sug-
gest that the structure of the EEC has reached a point similar to 
that of the thirteen original States after the adoption of the 
United States Constitution in 1789. The point is that analogies, 
and perhaps hopes and aspirations, derived from the American ex-
11. Anthony, Comments on the Common Market, 41 WASH. L. REV. 423, 424 (1966). 
12. Vargas-Hidalgo, The Process of Integration in Latin America, 15 COMP. JuR. REV. 
105, 130-132 (1978). 
13. Id. at 131. 
14. See, e.g., P. HAY. FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATION: PATTERNS FOR 
NEW LEGAL STRUCTURES (1966); Schoenbaum, The Growth of Judicial Power in the Euro-
pean Economic Community, 48 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 32, 33 (1969), discussing the "recent 
history of the Court of Justice as involving quasi-constitutional crises strikingly similar to 
those faced by the Supreme Court of the United States in its early history." 
6
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perience have been present in the minds of proponents of regional 
integration. 
IL THE EFFORT TO CREATE 
SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
It is possible to arrange international economic integration in 
such a way as to create no structural relationships involving 
supranational organs, and little or no interference with national 
sovereignty. Action can be taken within such a framework by 
means of traditional diplomatic negotiations leading to universal 
consent, or at least to general consent, not binding on those par-
ties not in agreement. Decisions so reached have effect only on the 
international plane and require the intervention of organs of the 
state before any question of their domestic enforceability arises. It 
is, on the other hand, possible to create a structure of a different 
nature with organs exercising .legislative, executive or judicial 
functions, having power to act by a majority, and having a direct 
effect in the legal order of member states. This latter kind of ar-
rangement involves some loss of power (sovereignty) on the part 
of member states and its concomitant transfer to the international 
organization. The EEC is an organization of this kind. As we shall 
see, the transfer of sovereignty is only partial, with the issue of 
the extent to which it will develop in considerable doubt. The role 
of the organs of the EEC in the integrative process has been ex-
plained as follows by a judge of the European Court: 
The Treaties establishing the Communities, from the point of 
view of substantive law, have merely laid down certain elemen-
tary rules relating primarily to the solution of immediate prob-
lems. The distance remaining to be covered from these points of 
departure to the final objective of customs and economic union 
must be covered by means of legislation, the formulation of 
which is entrusted to the common institutions.15 
We turn then to an examination of each of the main organs of 
the Community to examine its role in contributing to the law-
making of the Community. Article 4 of the Treaty of Rome creates 
four "institutions" by which "[t]he achievement of the tasks en-
15. P. PESCATORE. THE LAW OF INTEGRATION: EMERGENCE OF A NEW PHENOMENON IN IN-
TERNATIONAL RELATIONS, nASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 58 
(1974). 
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trusted to the Community shall be ensured": an Assembly, a 
Council, a Commission and a Court of J ustice.16 Following a discus-
sion of these four organs, it will be necessary to say something 
about an increasingly important body not mentioned in the Treaty 
but developed in the practice of the Community, the European 
Council. 
A. The Assembly 
Both in respect of the powers granted it under the Treaty of 
Rome11 and the role it has played in the life of the community, 
the Assembly or European Parliament is the least significant of 
the institutions in the process of integration. It consists of 
representatives of States Members who until 1979 were 
designated from among the members of the respective 
Parliaments but more recently have been elected by direct suf-
frage to a five-year term.18 However, it does not have the 
legislative powers, the right of initiative or even the power of the 
purse normally possessed by a national Parliament. 
Article 137 of the Treaty of Rome says that the Assembly 
"shall exercise the powers of deliberation and of control which are 
conferred upon it by this Treaty." Such powers must therefore be 
gleaned from an examination of various specific provisions of the 
Treaty of Rome. Thus, several articles of the Treaty confer on the 
Assembly the right to give advice on the formulation of Communi-
ty legislation which is adopted by the Council or the Commission in 
the form of Regulations, Directives and Decisions.19 The procedure 
16. Almost as an afterthought, art. 4 states: "The Council and the Commission shall 
be assisted by an Economic and Social Committee acting in a consultative capacity." This 
Committee has members selected from labor, management, agricultural, consumer and 
family organizations. The Committee provides some expertise as well as input from 
pressure groups, but it has not played a large role in the life of the Community and no fur-
ther discussion of it is proposed. Such detail concerning it as the Treaty provides is in ar-
ticles 193-198. 
17. Articles 137-144. On the Assembly, see generally V. HERMAN & J. LODGE, THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1978). 
18. See Council Decision 76/787, 19 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 278) 5 (1976), which required 
adoption by Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requ•rements 
and Council Decision 78/639, 20 O. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 205) 75 (1978), fixing the period for the 
first election. 
19. Articles 7 (rules designed to prohibit discrimination on grounds of nationality), 
14.7 (reduction of customs duties), 43.2 (common agricultural policy), 54.2 and 56.2 (right of 
establishment), 57.1 (mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of for-
mal qualifications). Article 189 of the Treaty describes Community legislation: 
For the achievemant of their aims and under the conditions provided for in this 
8
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for major legislation is as follows: the Commission submits a for-
mal proposal to the Council which is sent to the Assembly with a 
request for its opinion. In due course an opinion is sent to the 
Council and the Commission, but it has no binding effect. Given a 
modicum of good faith by the Council, the Assembly's views will 
carry some weight but the Assembly is by no stretch of the ima-
gination akin to a house of a legislature so far as law-making is 
concerned. Since 1975, the impact of the Assembly's views in some 
areas has been increased by the Council's acquiescence in the so-
called "concertation procedure." While the power of the Council 
has not been formally reduced, that body has agreed to meet with 
the Assembly to discuss differences of opinion on Community acts 
having financial implications. A "concertation" committee of Coun-
cil representatives, members of the Assembly's political groups 
and Commission representatives is established to seek an accom-
modation.20 
The Assembly also possesses "supervisory" powers. First, 
article 140 of the Treaty of Rome requires the Commission to re-
ply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the Assembly or 
its members. This power to ask questions has been much used in 
practice and permits some policy influence akin to that exercised 
in national parliaments by questions from back-benchers. The 
practice has also arisen of asking questions of the Council which 
usually answers them, although there seems to be no legal require-
ment that it do so. Second, the Commission must submit an annual 
report to the Assembly, which must discuss it in open session. 21 
There is then a valuable opportunity for a wide-ranging debate on 
the Community's activities. Third, the Assembly, by means of a 
motion of censure adopted by a two-thirds majority, may exercise 
a power akin to that granted by the motion of no-confidence pro-
cedure to a legislature in a British Parliamentary system, to force 
Treaty, the Council and the Commission shall adopt regulations and directives, 
make decisions and formulate recommendations or opinions. 
Regulations shall have a general application. They shall be binding in every 
respect and directly applicable in each Member State. 
Directives shall bind any Member State to which they are addressed, as to the 
result to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to form 
and means. 
Decisions shall be binding in every respect for the addressees named therein. 
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force. 
20. See discussion in HERMAN & LODGE , supra note 17, at 32. 
21. Treaty of Rome art. 143. 
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the members of the Commission to resign as a body. 22 However, 
the members of the Commission are appointed by the common ac-
cord of the governments of the Member States23 and the 
Assembly has no direct influence on their replacements. Further-
more, members of the Commission, notwithstanding a motion of 
censure, continue to serve until replaced in accordance with the 
common accord procedure. 24 It will therefore come as no surprise 
that the censure procedure is largely a dead letter; as of 1979 only 
three motions of censure, all of them unsuccessful, had taken 
place.25 There is, in fact, one overriding reason why the sanction is 
unlikely to be applied. Being committed, in theory at least, to the 
"European view," the Assembly is more likely to find itself allied 
with the Commission in opposition to the Council than it is to be at 
loggerheads with the Commission. It has no power beyond debate 
and publicity to make its point in any dispute with the Council. 
The Assembly lacks other supervisory powers that might be 
expected of a parliament. No budgetary functions were given to 
the Assembly under the Treaty of Rome; the power of the purse 
is, of course, the classic way in which a legislature can assert 
itself. Of recent years tentative steps have been taken to give the 
Assembly some power in this respect but it is too soon to tell how 
significant those developments will prove to_ be.26 Again, the 
Assembly plays no part in the appointment of the members of the 
Court of Justice. The judges, like the members of the Commission, 
are appointed by common consent of the governments.27 
In sum: 
At present, the Parliament contributes little toward the 
legitimation of the exercise of sovereign powers by the other in-
stitutions of the Community. Although it represents most direct-
ly the ideal of people's sovereignty, the Parliament is granted 
very limited powers to participate in decision-making. Moreover, 
22. Treaty of Rome art. 144. 
23. Treaty Constituting a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European 
Communities (1965) art. 11 [hereinafter Merger Treaty]. 
24. Treaty of Rome art. 144. 
25. Muller-Graff, Direct Elections to the European Parliament, 11 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT'L L. 1, 26 n. 119 (1979). 
26. See the Treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single 
Commission of the European Communities, July 22, 1975, 20 0. J. Eun. COMM. (No. L 359) (1977) 
(effective 1 June 1977). 
27. Treaty of Rome art. 167. 
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the Parliament has only a very weak authority to supervise the 
activities of the Commission.28 
11 
Whether direct elections of Assembly members will lead to pres-
sures for a larger supranational role for the Assembly remains to 
be seen. In principle, direct elections by t~e people ought to result 
in greater legitimacy for the Assembly. In practice, given the fact 
that the membership was elected by different procedures in dif-
ferent states and that the voting turnout was extremely low in 
some cases (32% in Britain and 47.8% in Denmark),29 the new com-
position of the Assembly may exacerbate national differences, 
rather than enhance the integrative process. 
B. The Council of Ministers 
The Council consists of representatives of Member States.30 
Each government is to delegate to it one of its members (typically 
this is the Minister of Foreign Affairs). The general functions of 
the Council are rather tersely defined in the Treaty. Article 145 
provides: 
With a view to ensuring the achievement of the objectives laid 
down in this Treaty, and under the conditions provided for 
therein, the Council shall: ensure the co-ordination of the general 
economic policies of the Member States, and dispose of a power 
of decision. 
In fact, the power to take decisions is representative of much 
broader specific powers found elsewhere in the Treaty of Rome 
which make the Council the chief legislative body of the Com-
munity- a legislative body with authority over quite a large area 
of activity directly affecting Member States. Acting on a proposal 
by the Commission, the Council has power to make Regulations, 
issue Directives, take Decisions, make Recommendations or 
deliver Opinions.31 In numerous law-making contexts the Council 
has power under the terms of the Treaty to act on a Commission 
recommendation by means of either a simple or a "qualified" 
28. Muller-Graff, supra note 25 at 27-28. 
29. See the analysis of election results in Keesing's Contemporary Archives 29893 ff 
(26 October 1979) entitled "European Communities-Direct Elections to European 
Parliament-National Campaigns and Results-Elected Members-Inaugural Session." 
30. Merger Treaty art. 2. 
31. Treaty of Rome art. 189, supra note 19. 
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(weighted) majority.32 The Council, however, has normally tried to 
ensure unanimity. Indeed, following a crisis in Community rela-
tions in 1965, an agreement was reached among the then six 
members of the Community, the effect of which was that decisions 
were only to be made unanimously.33 A later Delphic statement by 
the Heads of Government of the nine members in 197434 pulls back 
some from the understanding reached at Luxembourg in January 
1966, but the search for unanimity continues, to the occasional 
point of paralysis, and the provisions of the Treaty of Rome con-
taining power to act by a majority are not fully invoked. Thus, the 
powers of the Council to act in the field of law-making by majority 
vote have remained more in the area of theory and potential than 
of actual application. Nevertheless, as we shall see in the section 
on the Community as a distinct legal order,35 the Council's law-
making activities have had a profound effect upon the juridical 
order of the Community and of its Member States. 
C. The Commission 
The members of the Council are representatives of states. 
The Commission is plainly designed to add an element of suprana-
tionality into the Community, in the form of officials who are not 
representatives of governments. The Commission consists of thir-
32. In a weighted majority vote France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom 
have ten votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands, five each, Denmark and Ireland, three 
each, and Luxembourg has two. Treaty of Rome art. 148. Forty-one votes in favor are 
necessary which prevents the "big four" from ganging up on the smaller states. Id. 
33. See BULL. EUR. COMM. 3-1966, point 3.9: 
b. Majority voting procedure 
I. Where, iu the case of decisions which may be taken by majority vote on a pro-
posal of the Commission, very important interests of one or more partners are at 
stake, the Members of the Council will endeavour, within a reasonable time, to 
reach solutions which can be adopted by all the Members of the Council while 
respecting their mutual interests and those of the Community, in accordance with 
Article 2 of the Treaty. 
II. With regard to the preceding paragraph, the French delegation considers that 
where very important interests are at stake the discussion must be continued until 
unanimous agreement is reached. 
III. The six delegations note that there is a divergence of views on what should be 
done in the event of a failure to reach complete agreement. 
IV. The six delegations nevertheless consider that this divergence does not pre-
vent the Community's work being resumed in accordance with the normal pro-
cedure. 
34. BULL. EUR. COMM. 12-1974, point 1104. 
35. See text accompanying notes 56-71 infra. 
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teen members chosen on the basis of "general competence" and 
whose "independence is beyond doubt."36 "Their duties," in the 
words of a distinguished writer, "are primarily to adopt a Euro-
pean posture."37 In the performance of their duties Commission 
members are forbidden to take instructions from any government 
or from any other body. Each Member State undertakes to respect 
this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the 
Commission in their tasks.38 Commission members hold office for a 
renewable term of four years. They act by majority vote. They 
have at their disposal a very large staff, the major bureaucracy of 
the Community. It is organized into departments called 
directorates-general. These directorates prepare proposals for the 
Commission and may consult experts from national governments, 
or trade, management, agriculture, or labor pressure groups. The 
Commission's stock-in-trade is information. 
The general powers of the Commission are set out in article 
155 of the Treaty of Rome. First, it must ensure that the provi-
sions of the Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions 
pursuant thereto are applied. Under this general rubric, it may 
even bring a member before the Court of Justice if it considers 
that the member has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Trea-
ty, including Regulations, Directives and Decisions made pursuant 
thereto.39 Typically, it tries to exercise its powers of persuasion 
before taking such a drastic course and it is usually able to get 
compliance without litigation.40 Second, it is required to make 
36. Merger Treaty art. 10. 
37. Thompson, The Common Market: A New Legal Order, 41 WASH. L. REV. 385, 387 
(1966). 
38. Merger Treaty art. 10. 
39. Treaty of Rome art. 169. 
40. The Commission's 13th General Report on the Activities of the European Com-
munities 1979 (1980) at 279 records that: 
The upward trend of the past few years in the number of infringement procedures 
under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty against Member States accelerated during 
1979 with 180 new cases being opened. The number of cases reaching the subse-
quent stages of the procedure also showed a marked increase; 79 reasoned opi-
nions were delivered and 18 new cases were brought before the Court. 
The breakdown by subject matter of the infringements presents a slightly dif-
ferent picture from previous years. The dominant sector remained that of the free 
movement of goods, including agricultural products, these infringements account-
ing for half of the new procedures in 1979. Increased Community activity in certain 
sectors, however, has led to a wider spread of the remaining cases, which cover 
right of establishment, social affairs (particularly equal pay), the environment, 
transport, taxation and fisheries. 
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various recommendations pursuant to specific provisions of the 
Treaty of Rome and it also has a general power to make recom-
mendations on matters dealt with in the Treaty if it considers 
such action necessary .41 Third, it is given some powers of deci-
sion,42 and participates in the legislative process by submitting 
proposals.43 Finally, it exercises power conferred upon it by the 
Council for the detailed implementation of rules laid down by the 
Council. In volume, a significant quantity of the "secondary," i.e., 
non-treaty, law of the Community is in the form of instruments 
adopted by the Commission acting on authority delegated by the 
Council. 
The Commission is designed as the prime catalyst in the in-
tegrative process and as an independent voice to speak for the 
wider interests of the Community, as opposed to those of its 
Member States. Nevertheless, it is at the mercy of the Council of 
Ministers so far as substantial norm-creating activities are con-
cerned. In practice, it spends much more of its efforts than one 
might have expected simply from reading the Treaty in seeking to 
obtain consensus by political means. 
D. The Court of Justice 
The decisions of the Court of Justice and their acceptance by 
national courts and governments constitute a remarkable example 
of supranationalism. · 
The Court consists of one judge from each Member State ap-
pointed by agreement of the governments to a term of six years, 
but eligible for reappointment.44 Article 164 describes the general 
function of the Court-to "ensure observance of law in the inter-
pretation and application of this Treaty." It has jurisdiction in five 
main areas relevant to the legal order of the Community.45 
41. Treaty of Rome art. 155. 
42. Particularly the power of derogation from Treaty obligations in case of emergen-
cies whi~h was exercisable during the transitional period before the Treaty of Rome came 
fully into effect. See Treaty art. 226. Article 189 of the Treaty, supra note 19, perhaps gives 
the impression that the Commission has more independent legislative power than is really 
the case. Most of its legislative output is based on power delegated by the Council. 
43. See, e.g., supra note 19, for examples, all of which require a proposal from the 
Commission, as well as the opinion of the Assembly before the Council may act. 
44. Treaty of Rome art. 167. 
45. It also has other minor areas of competence including that under art. 179 of the 
Treaty of Rome in employment disputes between the Community and its servants. On the 
Court as integrator, see A. GREEN, POLITICAL INTEGRATION BY JURISPRUDENCE (1969). 
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First, article 169 of the Treaty of Rome provides that if the 
Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an 
obligation under the Treaty, the Commission is to deliver a 
reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the state concerned an 
opportunity to submit its observations. If the state does not 
comply with the Commission's opinion, the Commission may bring 
the matter before the Court. The Commission has used this power 
several times. 46 
Second, in a similar fashion, under article 170, if a Member 
State considers that another Member State has failed to comply 
with its Treaty obligations, it may bring the matter before the 
Court after first having taken it to the Commission. As is the case 
with other state-against-state enforcement procedures, (for exam-
ple, in the human rights area), states are reluctant to make use of 
the article 170 procedure. However, the Court last year rendered 
its first decision in an article 170 case, finding in favor of France 
in a case in which that country alleged that the United Kingdom 
was in breach of the Treaty of Rome in adopting certain fishing 
regulations. 47 
The Court's decisions under both articles 169 and 170 are not 
merely advisory. Article 171 provides that if the Court finds that a 
Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty, 
the Member State shall be required to take the necessary 
measures to comply with the judgment of the Court. 
Third, article 173 of the Treaty of Rome empowers the Court 
to review the legality of the acts of the Council and the Commis-
sion other than recommendations or opinions, the latter having no 
dispositive legal effect. For this purpose it has jurisdiction in ac-
tions brought by a Member State, by the Council, by the Commis-
sion, or in the case of any person, against a decision which, 
although in the form of a Regulation or a Decision addressed to 
another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former. 
The grounds for which nullity may be alleged are lack of com-
petence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, in-
fringement of the Treaty of Rome or any rule of law relating to its 
application, and misuse of powers. If one of these grounds is 
established, the Court must declare that the act concerned is 
void.'8 
46. Thirteenth General H.eport, supra note 40. 
47. Id. at 281. 
48. Treaty of Rome art. 17 4. 
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Fourth, article 177 of the Treaty of Rome grants the Court 
jurisdiction to make "preliminary rulings" concerning matters 
arising in proceedings before national courts concerning (a) the in-
terpretation of the Treaty, (b) the validity and interpretation of 
acts of the institutions of the Community, (c) the interpretation of 
the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council where 
those statutes so provide. According to the third paragraph of ar-
ticle 177, when such a question arises before an inferior tribunal in 
a Member State and that tribunal considers a ruling on the point 
necessary to reach a judgment, it may request the European 
Court to give a ruling thereon. A domestic court of last resort 
must so request. Procedurally, matters. referred to the European 
Court under article 177 will usually arise in a national court either 
in cases between private parties or between a private party and a 
government (usually that of the forum state) in which one of the 
parties relies upon the Treaty or an act of the Community as the 
basis for its legal position. Sovereign sensitivities of domestic 
courts are protected by the reference to "preliminary rulings" in 
article 177. The European Court does not reach down and decide 
the case as such. It leaves it to the national court to apply its rul-
ings to the facts of the particular situation. Needless to say, those 
preliminary rulings will often be determinative of the result in 
domestic litigation. 
In terms of the Court's caseload and its contribution to the 
ongoing process of integration, article 177 is the most significant 
of the bases of the Court's jurisdiction. As Judge Pescatore has 
noted in his excellent work on The Law of Integration: 
The really original innovation of the Treaties of Rome has been 
to set up for the application of Community law a direct relation-
ship between judicial powers, a relationship which is much more 
than mere consultation: a relationship on the basis of jurisdiction 
and powers. Henceforth, it is the exercise of the judicial office 
itself that is shared, following well-defined conceptions, between 
the Community level and the national level. From this flows an 
integrating effect, the scope and depth of which experience alone 
can measure.49 
49. PESCATORE, supra note 15, at 91. See also Raworth, Article 177 of the Treaty of 
Rome and the Evolution of the Doctrine of the Supremacy of Community Law, [1977] CAN. 
Y.B. lNT'L L. 276. 
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Nonetheless, the integrating tendencies of article 177 may be 
sabotaged by domestic tribunals at two stages of the process- by 
failing to make requests for rulings to the Court of Justice or by 
finding some way to avoid applying its rulings once they have 
been made. Both kinds of evasion have taken place. Professor Bux-
baum noted in 1969 that there were significant numbers of cases 
where a request might have been expected but was not made.50 
This problem has perhaps diminished but it has not vanished with 
the passage of time. The most recent Report of the Commission of 
the Communities notes that, although in several other instances 
the French Conseil d'Etat has made referrals to the Court, it had 
with its decision in the Cohn Bendit case of 12 December 1978, 
failed to fulfill its obligation to do so under article 177 of the Trea-
ty. 51 The Conseil had furthermore disregarded case law of the 
Court which gave "direct effect" (so that individuals could rely 
upon it in national courts) to a Council Directive on coordination of 
special measures concerning the movement and residence of 
foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, 
public security or public health. The Commission's report52 states 
that "[t]he Commission has informed the French Government of its 
grave concern on this matter." More shall be said about the prob-
lem created when national courts ignore the Community Court's 
advice in a later section of this paper dealing with the Community 
as a new legal order. 53 
Fifth, the final jurisdictional base of the Court which should 
be mentioned is article 178, which gives the Court jurisdiction 
over damage actions against the Community based on non-
contractual (tort) liability for the acts of Community institutions, 
officials, or employees. Suits for the tortious acts of the suprana-
tional organs thus come before a supranational Court. 
E. The European Council 
A body not envisaged by the Treaty of Rome has been play-
ing an increasing role in the work of the Community. This is the 
meeting of Heads of State or Government referred to as the Euro-
50. Buxbaum, Article 177 of the Rome Treaty as a Federalizing Device, 21 STAN. L. 
REV. 1041 (1969). 
51. 13th General Report, supra note 40, at 278. 
52. Id. 
53. See notes 64-71 infra. 
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pean Council, a name which causes some confusion between it and 
the Council of the Communities. The European Council had its 
origin in the need to hold periodic high level meetings to consider 
matters which were of common concern to the members of the 
Community but which did not come strictly within the ambit of 
the Treaty of Rome. Heads of State or of Government had met ir-
regularly throughout the life of the Community, and this practice 
was formalized in December of 1974.54 Establishing the position of 
this new body perhaps represents the entrenchment of another 
rival for the Commission, another political rather than suprana-
tional power center. The President of the Commission has put 
about the best appearance he can on the matter in these words: 
In this way [meetings of the European Council] the Heads of 
Government are being closely identified with the construction of 
Europe; this, in turn, enhances the significance of Europe in the 
eyes of the Community citizen. The distinction between matters 
falling strictly within the Community's competence and those 
concerned with foreign policy is now being played down, rather 
than, as at one time, emphasized. This must be the correct ap-
proach, because we are looking at two sides of the same coin; at 
the end of the day, political and economic union become in-
separable.55 
Ill THE CREATION OF A DISTINCT LEGAL ORDER 
Article 164 of the Treaty of Rome, as has already been men-
tioned,56 provides that the Court of Justice is to ensure that what 
is tantalizingly called "the law" is observed. One might reasonably 
ask which "law" is to be observed and what is its juridical nature. 
Some answers can be given to these questions on the basis of the 
Treaty itself and practice pursuant to it.57 What is involved is not 
54. See discussions in Jenkins, The European Community as It Faces Its Second 
Enlargement, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 381, 384 (1978). 
55. Id. at 384-385. 
56. See text supra note 45. 
57. See generally PESCATORE, supra note 15, at 74-76. Pescatore suggests that: 
[t]he English version of Article 164 does not precisely convey the sense of the 
original, and especially the French and German texts. A fully adequate translation 
would have said that the Court of Justice is entrusted with the task of 'ensuring 
observation of the rule of law' in the interpretation and application of the Treaty. 
This would have opened a much deeper insight into the fundamentals of the Com-
munity than the present version which, alas, has become authentic. Id. at 74, n. 
12a. 
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merely the law of Member States, or some general doctrines of in-
ternational law, but the law of a new regime, "Community law." 
So far as its formal sources are concerned, the primary source is 
the law laid down in the Treaty of Rome, which not only sets out 
rights and obligations of an international nature, but also amounts 
to the basic constitutional document of the organization. The sec-
ond major source of Community law is often described as "Com-
munity secondary law," that is to say, the Regulations, Directives 
and Decisions made by the Council of Ministers and the Commis-
sion. A third source, perhaps of increasing importance, is that of 
general principles common to the Member States.58 In one in-
stance, at least, this source is specifically mentioned in the Treaty 
of Rome. This is in article 215 where the relevant tort rules in the 
case of suits against the Community are said to be "the general 
principles common to the laws of Member States." The 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice had indicated, however, that 
such general principles may be available in other contexts also, 
such as the protection of human rights, and to provide the content 
of "the law" as understood in article 164.59 
So far as the juridical nature of Community law is concerned, 
this involves looking at the way in which it differs from domestic 
law or from international law and its place in the legal order of a 
particular Member State. These matters have been dealt with 
from various points of view in the Community Court and the 
courts of the Member States. 
The first important consideration by the Community Court 
was in the Van Gend en Loos case in 1963.60 The plaintiff, a Dutch 
company, imported a quantity of a chemical into the Nether lands 
58. Recall in this context the reference amongst the sources of law which the Interna-
tional Court of Justice is to apply to "the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations." STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38. The general principles 
of the Community states are not necessarily the same as those of the whole spectrum of 
"civilized nations." 
59. See, e.g., Nold v. Commission, Case No. 4/73 [1974] E.C.R. 491, 507-08. PESCATORE, 
supra note 15, at 74 also gives as sources of Community law (a) "comparative law" and (b) 
the "growth of custom," for example, methods of cooperation between the Commission, the 
Council and the Parliament. It is difficult to see. how his comparative law is different from 
other writers' general principles. The kind of custom he mentions is close to the British no-
tion of the customs or conventions of the constitution - for example, the rule, not laid down 
in statute, that a Minister defeated by a motion of no-confidence must resign. 
60. Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, Case No. 26/62 
(1963] E.C.R. 1. 
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from Germany. It was required, pursuant to a statute which 
brought into force for The Nether lands a modification of the 
BENELUX tariff resulting from the acceptance by the BENELUX 
nations of a new customs nomenclature, to pay duty at the rate of 
8% ad valorem. The pl~intiff later claimed back the duty paid in 
the appropriate administrative tribunal, the Tariff Commission in 
Amsterdam. It argued that the imposition of the duty at 8% infr-
inged article 12 of the Treaty of Rome. The reasoning was that 
before the date of the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome, the 
import duty on the chemical from Germany to The Netherlands 
was 3%, and article 12 prohibited Member States from increasing 
customs duties on imports from other Member States after the 
Treaty came into effect. The issue was referred to the Community 
Court pursuant to article 177 of the Treaty. The Court of Justice 
held that the provisions of article 12 were self-executing, in the 
sense that no further action such as a Regulation or Directive by 
Community organs was necessary to give effect to them, and that 
they could be invoked by the private party in the Dutch pro-
ceeding. Most important for the present discussion, the Court 
referred as follows to the nature of Community law: 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community con-
stitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of 
which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit 
within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only 
Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the 
legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only 
imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer 
upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. 
These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by 
the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty 
imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon 
the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community .61 
Implicit in the Court's analysis in the Van Gend case is a notion of 
the supremacy of- Community law in a conflict with national law, 
even a national law later in time, and an expectation that Com-
munity law would be applied by national courts in the event of a 
conflict. The Court made this explicit when it returned to the 
special nature of Community law the following year in Costa v. 
61. Id. 
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E.N.E.L .. 62 That case concerned the compatibility of the na-
tionalization of an Italian electricity company with certain provi-
sions of the Treaty of Rome. The Court strongly supported the 
view that Italian laws subsequent to the Treaty must give way if 
they are inconsistent with the Treaty and ought not to be applied 
by Italian courts. It again asserted that members of the Communi-
ty have limited their sovereign rights permanently. "Consequent-
ly Article 177 is to be applied regardless of any domestic law, 
whenever questions relating to the interpretation of the Treaty 
arise."63 
It is only fair to add that national courts are not always as en-
thusiastic about the supremacy of Community law as is the Com-
munity Court. Several members of the Community have constitu-
tional or other legal rules that afford supremacy to Community 
norms;64 others do not. A provision in the French Constitution 
which arguably gives supremacy to treaty norms over subsequent 
legislation, has not always been so interpreted by French courts, 
especially the administrative courts headed by the Conseil 
d'Etat.65 In the Costa v. E.N.E.L. proceedings, the Italian Supreme 
Court ultimately succeeded in avoiding applying the European 
Court's opinion by the familiar device of finding that Costa, a 
shareholder in the nationalized company, had no standing to sue.66 
(The lower court which had requested the preliminary ruling had 
followed the Community Court's reasoning to find the nationaliza-
tion void.) Later in the Frontini case,67 the Italian Constitutional 
Court upheld the supremacy of Community law in light of article 
11 of the Italian Constitution, which enables Italy to consent equal-
62. Case No. 6/64 [1964] C.M.L.R. 429. 
63. Id. 
64. See material in STEIN, supra note 4, at 94-108; Warner, The Relationship Between 
European Community Law and the National Laws of Member States, 93 L.Q. REV. 349 
(1977). The Netherlands Constitution contains such a provision. In theory, therefore, the 
plaintiff in Van Gend should have had no difficulty in succeeding when the case went back to 
the Tariff Commission following the European Court's preliminary ruling. However, the 
situation was confused because there was also a BENELUX obligation involved and the 
Constitution does not seem to give a ready answer to the question of primacy of conflicting 
treaty obligations if, as it appears, that was the case. I have not noticed anything in the 
literature that says what the Tariff Commission did next. 
65. See Warner, supra note 64, 361-632; the Commission's complaint, supra note 40; 
and E. BERGSTEN, COMMUNITY LA w IN THE FRENCH COURTS: THE LA w OF TREATIES IN MODERN 
ATTIRE (1973). 
66. STEIN, supra note 4, at 211. 
67. [197 4] C.M.L.R. 372. 
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ly with other states to limit its sovereignty "in so far as this may 
be necessary to enable the creation of any organization assuring 
peace and justice among nations." In a subsequent judgment, 
however, the Constitutional Court, while affirming the principles 
of Frontini, held that only it had power to declare an Italian 
statute void on the ground of its incompatibility with Community 
law. The fly in the ointment here is that another rule of the 
Court's constitutional jurisprudence is that a decision of the Court 
voiding a statute has only prospective effect. It does not apply in 
the particular proceedings. This is, of course, of little consolation 
to the litigant in the particular case and is far from what the Com-
munity Court had in mind. 
In short, the Community Court has spoken of a new legal 
order, distinct from general rules of international law and from 
the old legal orders of Member States. It has asserted and 
reiterated69 its position on the supremacy of Community norms 
bluntly and clearly. On the other hand, its views are sometimes ig-
nored or side-stepped by national courts. The European Court's 
strategy is apparently to concede that it may lose a few rounds in 
the near future, and to hope for a little moral support from the 
Commission,70 and hope also that in the long run the integrative 
process will take hold and its view will prevail in all Member 
States. In an extra-judicial statement, Judge Pescatore, referring 
to the problem of national courts, has suggested that "[t]hey [na-
tional courts] must face up to the difficulty, and it is hard to see 
how in the long term they could remain impervious to a logic 
which has been so clearly and imperatively put before them."11 
IV. TREATY-MAKING POWER 
The last of the "supranational" aspects of the European Com-
munities to be reviewed is that of the treaty-making power of the 
68. I.c.I.c. v. Ministero del Commercio con l'Estero, case 232/75, II, Consiglio di Sta to, 
1975, No. 10, Pt. II, p. 1104, as cited in Warner, supra note 64, at 363. 
69. E.g., Italian Finance Administration v. Simmenthal S.p.A., Case No. 106/77 [1978] 
E.C.R. 629, where the Court attacked the Italian practice referred to in the case cited supra 
note 68, in these words: 
[T]he national courts must protect rights conferred by provisions of the Communi-
ty legal order and .. . it is not necessary for such courts to request or await the ac-
tual setting aside by the national authorities empowered so to act of any national 
measures which might impede the direct and immediate application of Community 
rules. 
70. As in the incident described in notes 51-52 supra. 
71. PESCATORE, supra note 15, at 98. 
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EEC. This matter has recently received some prominence in the 
context of efforts to draft a new Law of the Sea Convention.72 The 
members of the Ten have been arguing, amidst a chorus of skep-
ticism from certain other participants in the Law of the Sea Con-
ference, that in some fields covered by the proposed Convention, 
Member States have transferred their legal powers to the Com-
munity. The latter must therefore be permitted to become a party 
to the Convention in order that all the objectives thereof may be 
fulfilled. On another front, in 1979, the Commission of the Com-
munities produced a widely-discussed memorandum entitled Ac-
cession of the Communities to the European Convention on 
Human Rights.13 The memorandum argues that it may be 
desirable for the Communities to become a party to the Conven-
tion on Human Rights in order to fully protect human rights from 
infringement by Community organs. An amending Protocol by the 
present parties to the Convention would be necessary to change 
its final clauses so as to make accession by the Community possi-
ble. The Commission's memorandum makes the rather telling 
point that "[a]ccession of the Community to an international 
mechanism of legal control would underline its own personality ."74 
Perhaps the discussions concerning the Law of the Sea and the 
European Convention should both be seen in light of assertions of 
supranationality by the Community and the attempt to have tha:t 
position recognized by other international actors. 
To understand these two initiatives, it is necessary to look 
back at developments on the wider international plane as well as 
practice within the Community itself. That international organiza-
tions may be subjects of international law, and may in particular 
be parties to international agreements, has been generally ac-
cepted since the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of 
Justice on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
72. See Koers, Participation of the European Economic Community in the New Law 
of the Sea Convention, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 426 (1979). Note that the Community also exercises 
foreign affairs power by means of legation. Representatives of over 100 states are ac-
credited to the Community. The Community has observer missions at the U.N. and 
Specialized Agencies. On the treaty-making power in general, see Kuznetsov, Possibilities 
for Cooperation Between COMECON and the European Economic Community, 17 SOVIET 
L. & GOV'T. 47 (1978-79); Leopold, External Relations Power of EEC in Theory and Practice, 
26 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 54 (1977). 
73. BULL. EUR. COMM. Supp. 2-1979. 
74. Id. at 12. 
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United Nations.75 For the most part, such personality in general, 
and treaty-making capacity in particular must be gleaned from 
somewhat ambiguous constitutional . documents of international 
organizations with the aid of such principles as implied powers, 
necessary intendment and functional necessity. The Treaty of 
Rome is unusual among the treaties creating international 
organizations in that it contains a provision, article 210, which 
asserts that "[t]he Community shall have legal personality." In 
context, this provision is clearly referring to international per-
sonality because the following article goes on to provide also for 
the Community's legal capacity within its Member States.76 There 
is still plenty of room left open for interpretation of the precise ex-
tent of such legal personality. 
Specific provisions of the Treaty of Rome take the matter fur-
ther. Articles 111(2), 113 and 114 confer clear power to conclude 
tariff and trade agreements. Article 238 permits the Community 
to "conclude with a third country, a union of States or an interna-
tional organization, agreements creating an association embodying 
reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and special pro-
cedures." 
Negotiations for agreements are conducted by the Commis-
sion. The Council of Ministers concludes the agreements after con-
sulting the European Parliament.77 In terms of the Treaty of 
Rome, a qualified majority will suffice for the conclusion of trade 
and tariff agreements78 although this is not standard practice; as in 
other areas of the operation of the Treaty, it is usual to seek con-
sensus. 
So much for the Treaty provisions on international 
agreements. Practice of the Community has both expanded and 
limited the provisions. Decisions of the European Court have 
made it apparent that the treaty-making powers of the Communi-
ty are not limited to the cases explicitly mentioned in the Treaty 
75. Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 
Nations [1949] I.C.J. 74. (The Court's reasoning relied heavily on the treaty-making power of 
the United Nations.) And note the ongoing efforts of the International Law Commission to 
produce a codification of the law on Treaties Concluded Between States and International 
Organizations or Between International Organizations. 
76. Treaty of Rome art. 211. 
77. Treaty of Rome art. 228. At least this is what the Treaty says. In practice, the 
Council participates more actively in the negotiation than the Treaty might suggest. 
78. Treaty of Rome art. 114. 
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of Rome. In the ERTA case,79 it was held that the reference in ar-
ticle 210 to the "legal personality" of the Community indicates 
that "in its external relations the Community enjoys the capacity 
to establish contractual links with third countries over the whole 
field of objectives" laid down in part one of the Treaty. (In the 
ERTA case the objective was the "Common Transport Policy" 
governed by title IV of the Treaty.) According to the Court in 
ERT A, treaty-making power may be exercised "in particular each 
time the Community, with a view to implementing a common 
policy provided for in the Treaty has laid down provisions by 
which common rules are introduced in one form or another ."80 
Subsequent decisions have held that it is not necessary for the 
Community to have actually laid down common internal rules for 
the treaty making power to come into play.81 Further, the Court 
has held that in many instances the Community's foreign relations 
power is exclusive, and Member States may no longer be able to 
act unilaterally. In the OECD case, involving negotiations on a 
local cost standard in respect of export credits, the Court remark-
ed that: 
To accept the contrary were true would amount to recognizing 
that in relations with third countries, Member States may adopt 
positions which differ from those which the Community intends 
to adopt, and would thereby distort the institutional framework, 
call into question the mutual trust within the Community and 
prevent the latter from fulfilling its task in the defence of the 
common interest.82 
What is plain from all of this is that the activity of treaty-
making is one that is subject to pragmatic expansion in the life of 
the Community. It is only fair to add that the membership of the 
79. Re the European Road Transport Agreement, Commission v. Council, Case No. 
22/70 [1971) E.C.R. 263, 274. 
80. Id. 
81. The existence of the power to lay down internal rules is sufficient. Opinion of the 
Court Given Pursuant to Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, Opinion No. 1/76 [1977) E.C.R. 
7 41. A source of treaty-making authority beyond even this was suggested by the Commis-
sion in its Memorandum on Accession of the European Communities to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, supra note 73, at 20, when it argued that particular action might 
be based on art. 235 of the Treaty of Rome which permits appropriate provisions to be 
adopted if such action appears necessary to achieve the objectives of the Community. 
82. Opinion of the Court Given Pursuant to Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, Opinion 
No. 1/75 [1975] E.C.R. 1355. 
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Community, so far as its views are reflected by the Council rather 
than the Commission or the Court, has shown some ambivalence 
about exercising the Community's powers to the hilt. One 
manifestation of this ambivalence has been the use of the so-called 
"mixed procedure," where not only the Community becomes party 
to the agreement but also the Member States individually. The 
most striking use of this procedure is the Lome Convention, an 
association agreement concluded with a number of developing 
Asian, Pacific and Caribbean States.83 Article 238 of the Treaty of 
Rome, which permits the conclusion of association agreements, ap-
pears to be broadly worded enough to make participation by the 
Member States unnecessary, although unanimity is required in 
the Council. Nevertheless, they were included. The Council, in 
determining to act this way, seems to have narrowed the scope of 
the solo treaty-making powers of the Community to tariff and com-
mercial agreements that come within the precise terms of articles 
111 and 113 of the Treaty, rather than the much broader approach 
that is supported by the language of article 238 and the Court's 
decisions. Then there is the case of the negotiations concerning 
the European Road Transport Agreement. In spite of its ringing 
support for Community power once action had been taken to har-
monize Community laws on certain areas of road transportation,84 
the Court found it necessary to acquiesce in a fait accompli 
whereby the Council had agreed that the Member States acting in 
concert (and not the Community) would carry on negotiations with 
other European countries and become parties to the final agree-
ment. Again, in the case of the OECD Understanding on a Local 
Cost Standard,85 notwithstanding the Court's 1975 opinion as to 
the exclusivity of Community power, for a lengthy period, France, 
West Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom entered into what 
amounted to individual understandings with Canada, Japan and 
the United States, until an informal "arrangement" was eventual-
83. The current Treaty (Lome II) is reproduced in 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 341 (1980). 
On the previous agreements with the developing countries, see g-enerally THE LOME CON -
VENTION AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (F. Alting von Geasu ed. 1977); Sim-
monds, The Lome Convention: Implementation and Renegotiation, 16 C.M.L. REV. 425 (1979). 
84. Supra note 79. For another recent example of the Court's support for the Commis-
sion's position about Community power against the Council's denial of power, see Re the 
Draft International Agreement on Natural Rubber, Opinion 1/78 (1979) C.M.L.R. 639. 
85.. Supra note 82. 
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ly reached in 1978 between the Community and those three coun-
tries.86 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has focused on what are arguably three of the 
most important juridical features of the European Community 
when that entity is viewed as an example of integration. Each 
raises issues of supranationality in one or more of the four senses 
of that term outlined above:87 
- Power to make decisions by majority vote (Council in cer-
tain law-making and treaty-making roles) 
- Substantial authority conferred upon organs composed of 
persons other than governmental representatives (Commis-
sion and Court of Justice) 
- Competence of agencies to deal directly and authoritatively 
with firms and individuals within Member States (Commis-
sion, Council and Court roles in the Community legal order) 
- Power formerly exercised by sovereign states transferred 
to the new entity (Council in its law-making and treaty-
making activities, Court, Commission in law-making and 
law-enforcement roles). 
But the situation is not one of unrelieved progression towards 
greater supranationality and greater integration. Any complete 
assessment of European integration has to place alongside these 
examples of the development of the integrative process the many 
examples of reluctance to give new powers to Community organs 
and even a reluctance to allow them to exercise fully the powers 
that seem to have been given them by the Treaty of Rome. 
86. BULL. EUR. COMM. 2-1979, point 2.2.35. 
87. See text accompanying supra note 10. 
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